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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
--0000000--
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 18321 
ROBERT HICKEN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
--0000000--
RESPONDENT' S BRIEF 
--0000000--
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent was charged with distribution of a controlled 
substance for value, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-
8(1) (a) (ii) (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent was tried before a jury on February 17, 1982 in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, presiding. The trial court 
issued a final order granting defendant-respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss the Information. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks a judgment and order of this Court affirming 
the trial court's final order granting defendant-respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss the Information. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 19, 1981, defendant-respondent Robert Hicken was 
at the home of Jerry Middleton in Provo, Utah, at the request of 
Jerry Middleton. Judy Smith was to arrive later. 
Mr. Middleton had previously been arrested for the offense of 
possession of marijuana. Officer Markling of the Provo City 
Police had agreed with Mr. Middleton that the police would work 
with him on his "possession of marijuana" charge if Mr. Middleton 
would introduce the police into other instances or identify other 
individuals (T. 32). 
Judy Smith had been a secretary in the Provo Police Depart-
ment's Detective Division for a period of approximately two years. 
She had no aquaintance with defendant Robert Hicken and had never 
seen or observed Mr. Hicken prior to the date charged of October 
19, 1981. Officer Markling had previously informed Miss Smith 
that Mr. Middleton would be able to introduce Miss Smith to someone 
who would make a buy of narcotics or assist her in making a buy. 
Pursuant to Officer Markling's directions, Miss Smith was given 
$120.00 and told to be at the residence of Jerry Middleton. Miss 
Smith did not know either Jerry Middleton or the defendant nor had 
she any knowledge of the friendship or relationship between Mr. 
Middleton and the defendant. 
The defendant Robert Hicken had arrived at the home previous 
to Miss Smith's arrival. When Miss Smith arrived, Mr. Hicken was 
on the phone talking to someone whose identity was unknown (T. 13). 
Prior to any introduction of Mr. Hicken to Miss Smith, Mr. Hicken 
and Mr. Middleton started talking about whether a Mr. Larsen would 
be home or not (T. 14). 
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Miss Smith testified under questioning by State's counsel: 
A: No. When Mr. Hicken got off the phone Mr. Hicken and 
Jerry started talking about whether, I would assume, Mr. 
Larsen would be home or not. Things to that nature. 
Q: So they were talking about whether or not Mr. Hicken's 
source was at home? 
A: Right. 
Q: Did he attempt to call? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Okay. What did he say to you as he was calling? 
A: He asked me how much I wanted, and I told him that I had 
$120, and then he told me that a quarter of a pound would be 
-- well, I asked him how much he had first of all. 
After some attempts, Mr. Hicken finally contacted the source, 
Mr. Larsen. Miss Smith overheard conversations from the defendant 
and Mr. Larsen regarding inquiries on behalf of Miss Smith made by 
the defendant. The conversation was as follows (again under 
questioning by State's counsel): 
Q: Did he indicate anything to you about that $150? 
A: I told him I only had $120. When he told me I could get 
a quarter of a pound for $150 -- Mr. Hicken told me that 
he said I could pay the $120 and he would pay $30 to make up 
the difference and that I could pay him back later. 
Q: So then did he finally reach who he was trying to get on 
the phone, this Mr. Larsen? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Okay. What happened then? 
A: He started talking to him and I heard him say -- ask him 
how much a quarter of a pound would be, and then he asked how 
much two lids would be, and he turned to me. Mr. Hicken 
asked me if I wanted two lids for $95. 
Q: What did you say? 
A: I told him yes I did. 
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Q: What happened then? 
A: He told the person Mr. Hicken told the person on the 
phone that we would be right over (T. 15 1. 15 - T. 16 1. 3). 
The parties arrived at the Larsen residence and Miss Smith 
testified of the conversation therein: 
Q: Okay. What happened when you got to Mr. Larsen's home? 
A: Mr. Larsen let us in and led us into the front room where 
he asked Mr. Hicken if he would drive him to the 7-Eleven 
before he sold him the stuff. 
Q: Then what happened? 
A: Mr. Hicken said that I was the one buying it, and so Mr. 
Larse·n said, "Oh." And he went into the back room. 
Q: Who was there? Who was there in the front room there at 
the Larsens? 
A: When they led me into the front room there was -- they 
introduced me to another man sitting in the front room already. 
They introduced me to him as Rex (T. 17). 
Miss Smith then testified that Mr. Larsen and Mr. Hicken went 
into a back room and returned wherein the defendant sat down by 
her and gave to her one of the bags of marijuana. 
Miss Smith then gave $100.00 to Mr. Larsen, the source, and 
Mr. Larsen returned $5.00 (T. 19 1. 15-20). 
Upon cross-examination of Miss Smith, she indicated that the 
source, Larsen, had returned from the back room with two baggies 
filled with marijuana, and not Mr. Hicken (T. 23 1. 13). 
Miss Smith had never known a Bob Hicken prior to that night 
nor had any suspicions or knowledge of any dealings in narcotics 
or selling or anything of that nature relating to Mr. Hicken (T. 
24 1. 20-29). Mr. Hicken never received possession of the money 
and the defendant alleges that he never received possession of any 
narcotics. 
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After the testimony of Miss Smith and Officer Markling, 
counsel for the defendant motioned the Court to dismiss the Informa-
tion filed against defendant in that the Information charbed the 
defendant with one count of distribution for value of a controlled 
substance, to-wit: Marijuana. Counsel contended that it appeared 
from the evidence, uncontradicted, that Mr. Hicken did not sell 
the marijuana to the undercover agent but that at most the defen-
dant had arranged for Miss Smith to purchase the marijuana. 
Counsel for the State had argued that the Accomplice Statute, 
U.C.A. §76-2-202, allowed the Information to stand,in that,the 
Accomplice Statute is applicable to the Controlled Substance Act. 
The trial court found that Title 76 of the Utah Criminal Code 
applied generally to the acts of the legislature but the Utah 
Controlled Substance Act was a specific statute and where the 
Controlled Substance Act dealt with the conduct specifically, the 
Controlled Substance Act took precedence and controlled. The 
Court found that the defendant was charged with one crime but the 
evidence supported another and consequently dismissed the informa-
tion filed against the defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
IT WAS ERROR TO CHARGE THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT UNDER §58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii). 
The general provisions of the Utah Criminal Code provide in 
§76-1-103 as follows: 
The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, 
the punishment for and defenses against any offense defined 
in this code or, except where otherwise specifically provided 
or the context otherwise requires, any offense defined outside 
this code; provided such offense was committed after the 
effective date of this code appeared (emphasis added). 
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Section 58~37~19 (1953) as amended provides as follows: 
It is th~ purpose of this act to regulate and control the 
substances designated within §58-37-4, and whenever the 
r~quirements proscribe, the offenses defined or the penalties 
imposed relating to substances controlled by this act shall 
be or appear to be in conflict with Title 51, Chapter 17, or 
any other laws of this state, the provisions of this act 
shall be controlling (emphasis added). 
In the present case, the defendant is charged with the offense 
of distribution for value of a controlled substance in violation 
of §58-37-B(l)(a)(ii) (1953), as amended. The defendant contends 
and the District Court agreed that the "arranging statute", §58-
37-8(l)(a)(iv) of the Utah Controlled Substance Act is applicable 
under the facts, as presented at trial. Said section provides: 
••• it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly and 
intentionally: (iv) To agree, consent, offer or arrange to 
distribute or dispense a controlled substance for value ••. 
(emphasis added). 
It is clear from the testimony of Judy Smith that the defen-
dant was acting only on behalf of the police officer in contacting 
the source and that the police officer, Mis~ Smith, was the person 
to purchase the marijuana and not the defendant. The defendant 
was merely acting in the capacity of arranging for a sale of the 
marijuana at the instance and request of the undercover agent, 
Judy Smith, and the agent, Jerry Middleton, who was acting under 
the direction of the police. Further, counsel for the State 
stipulated in his opening argument to the jury that the defendant 
was not "some high-powered drug dealer or some drug pusher." The 
State's counsel argued: 
In fact, I am just going to show you this defendant was more 
of a middleman. He encouraged and aided and furthered the 
drug transaction in violation of law which wouldn't have 
occurred if he hadn't been around to make sure the sale went 
through • • • he got on the phone and made some arrangements 
to buy some marijuana, to get her some marijuana (T. 6). 
-6-
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This Court, in Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979), 
found that the Controlled Substance Act applied more specifically 
to the defendant's offense and took precedence over the Criminal 
Code's general forgery statute. 
In Helmuth, the petitioner argued that his conviction of 
uttering a forged prescription should be dictated and controlled 
by the Utah Criminal Code and not by the Utah Controlled Substance 
Act. 
The defendant's argument in Helmuth was based upon equal 
protection. Specifically, the defendant-petitioner argued the 
Utah Criminal Code §76-6-50l(l)(b) controlled the sentencing and 
~ 
that defendant's conduct was proscribed therein as a misdemeanor 
and should be treated as such. The Utah Controlled Substance Act 
also applied to the acts of the defendant, but, however made said 
conduct a felony. 
This Court held as follows: 
We recognize the soundness of his (defendant's) contention 
that where two interdict the same conduct, but impose 
different penalties, the violator is entitled to the lesser 
punishment . • • inasmuch as the former act applies more 
specifically to the plaintiff's offense, it takes precedence 
over the latter act. 
Correlated to the foregoing, it is to be noted that the 
legislature has expressly provided in §58-37-19 of the 
Controlled Substance Act that 'whenever • • • the penalties 
impose relating to substances controlled by this act shall be 
or appear to be in conflict with ••• any other laws of this 
state, the provisions of this act shall be controlling.' 
Thus, even if petitioner were correct in his postulate that 
the statute referred to prohibited the same conduct, the 
legislature has declared that the provisions of Title 58 
Chapter 17, rather than those contained in the Criminal ' 
Code, are to be applied in offenses relating to narcotic 
drugs. 
In the instant case, the facts are more applicable and 
specifically controlled by the Utah Controlled Substance Act 
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§58-37-S(l)(a)(iv)--Arranging. 
Defendant refers the Court to State v. Harrision, 601 P.2d 
922 (Utah 1979). The appellant therein argued that §58-37-
8(1) (a) (iv) was unconstitutionally vague. This Court, finding 
otherwise, defining the arranging statute, stated: 
Thus any witting or intentional lending of aid in the distri-
bution of drugs, whatever form it takes, is proscribed by the 
act. The citizen of average intelligence is left with no 
confusion as to what type of conduct is forbidden. 
In Harrison, the defendant was convicted under §58-37-8(1) 
(a)(iv) of arranging distribution for value of a controlled 
substance. In that case the Vernal Police Department sent a 
police informant to the defendant's residence for the purpose of 
purchasing cocaine. When the informant arrived at the defendant's 
home, he was told that the defendant could not supply cocaine but 
was told an acquaintance of the defendant's might be able to 
furnish a substitute substance. The defendant took the police 
informant to meet the acquaintance by the name of "Suzy" and a 
drug transaction ensued between "Suzy" and the police informant. 
The facts in that case are strikingly similar to the case of 
Harrision where the respondent was approached by a police under-
cover agent to secure the purchase of marijuana. The defendant 
• herein, unable or unwilling to accomodate the police undercover 
agent, takes the undercover agent to the residence of Mr. Larsen 
and a drug transaction occurs between Mr. Larsen (the source) and 
the undercover agent. 
Section 58-37-B(l)(a)(iv) specifically covers the area 
charged herein and preempts the application of the general provi-
sions of the U.tah Criminal Code §76-1-103(1). The "arranging" 
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statute supplants the "accomplice" statute of the Criminal Code as 
applied to the facts herein, State v. Harrison. 
Section 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), under which the defendant was 
charged, specifically covers and clearly proscribes the sale of a 
controlled substance or possession with intent to sell a 
proscribed substance. See, State v. Mills, 641 P.2d 119 (Utah 
1982); State v. Hubbard, 601 P.2d 929 (Utah 1979); and State v. 
Crabtree, 618 P.2d 484 (Utah 1980). 
It is accepted in this and other jurisdictions that a specific 
statute (arranging) takes precedence over a general statute 
(accomplice). See, Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979); 
In Re Smart, 505 P.2d 1979 (Hawaii 1973); and 73 Am.Jur.2d 
Statutes §257 (1974) Under the definition of Harrison, the 
Arranging Statute supplements and pre-empts the application of the 
Accomplice Statute. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent was improperly charged under U.C.A. §58-37-
8(1) (a) (ii). Section 58-37-B(l)(a)(iv) is applicable in the 
instant case and specifically applies to any conduct for which the 
defendant is criminally liable. When the Utah Controlled 
Substance Act specifically applies to a specific fact or situation 
the Controlled Substance Act takes precedence over and pre-empts 
any and all general statutes, including the Accomplice Statute of 
the Utah Criminal Code. The dismissal of the State's Information 
against the defendant was properly granted and should not be 
disturbed by this Court. 
(continued) 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. this _:d_ day of July, 1982. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and accurate copy of 
the foregciing.to David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General, and Robert 
N. Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, Attorneys for Appellant, 
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid, 
this day of July, 1982. 
1.·' 
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